Effectively countering the threat to battlefield ground assets from air attack has become significantly more challenging as demonstrated in the Ukraine conflict.
Although traditional ‘air superiority’ by either side has been unachievable in the Ukraine War, aerial attacks have continued. Factors contributing to this impasse include the efficiency of the Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD) including accurate detection and targeting by both precision ground or air launched weapons and electronic warfare assets. Active air defence assets like radar are particularly targets.
Jon Ferko, senior director Mission Solutions at Northrup-Grumman suggested that “today’s digital radar…drawing on AESA technology offers exceptional coverage and accuracy. The challenge on the battlefield will be to assure their survival.” This may demand air defence assets that are self-contained, can be quickly relocated, and operate cooperatively, alternately radiating and monitoring to assure their survival. This could necessitate more systems over an area than would be normally expected.
A second factor altering the nature of the aerial battle is the introduction and proliferation of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) large and small. Whereas traditional ground-based air defences have previously focused on intercepting missiles, manned aircraft and helicopters, the characteristics of many of these new aerial platforms offer different challenges. As Lieutenant General VK Saxena (Ret), the former director general of Indian Army Air Defence detailed in an August 2022 article for the Vivekananda International Foundation stated, “since the advent of the ‘unmanned’ in the tactical battlefield the prosecution of the air threat has never been the same… today the Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), especially the small drones, along with drone swarms are re-defining how the air threat will be delivered in the tactical battle”. He goes further suggesting that “they render the kill by conventional (GBAD) disproportionally skewed” due to their discrete nature, low cost, and resulting battlefield proliferation.
GBAD In Ukraine
Based on the current air war in Ukraine, air defences against traditional air forces remain invaluable. At time of writing at the beginning of April 2023, Ukraine was claiming (not independently verified) to have destroyed over 300 Russian aircraft and nearly as many helicopters (uawar.net/stats) and thus preventing Russia’s air force from controlling the skies over the battlefield. However, the depth and variety of potential effect that aerial platforms can deliver places diverse demands on GBAD’s response. This is reflected in its varying missions and methods of employment traditionally defined as self-defence, point defence, and area defence. Even as the fielding of GBAD systems specifically to counter each of these new aerial threats are being aggressively pursued, a key issue exists in that there are never enough to cover all the airspace, and at any given point they may be overwhelmed or simply not poitioned where needed. This dilemma has been further complicated by the addition UAVs to the airborne arsenal.
All combat involving aerial platforms, whether air-to-air or surface-to-air, contains a common characteristic of rapidity of action. The effectiveness of GBAD is a function of the system’s ability to successfully detect, classify, identify, and engage a presented air threat and do so often in seconds. This process is complicated by multiple factors including the limits of equipment, geography, and imposed engagement conditions. Terrain itself is a key influence with battlefield surveillance and detection systems including many tactical radars being largely ‘line-of-site’ sensors. As a result, aerial targets may hidden by ground features and simply the curvature of the earth. An aircraft flying at 100 feet (30 metres) above ground level (AGL) could approach its target to within 13 miles (21km) unobserved. This case offers a GBAD system less than two minutes to react. This time would be shortened where the target is using terrain (nap of the earth – NOE), forest and other natural cover. On top of this, rules of engagement often call for positive identification before shooting which prevents taking full advantage of the GBAD capabilities.
Area GBAD
GBAD is generally categorised as area air defence designed to cover a broad air space, Point air defence is focused on protecting a specific target like an air base or port. Area GBAD is characterised by engagement ranges measured in hundreds of kilometres, typically with radar direction, mid-course correction and on-board terminal guidance. It is often provided by systems like the US Raytheon MIM-104_Patriot, Fakel Russian S-300 and S400 Triumf and EUROSAM SAMP/T. These are ideally located in mutually supporting positions to the rear of the battle area under Corps or higher control. They have extended ranges with the Patriot PAC-2 reaching out to 100 miles (160 km) and S-400 between 124-250 miles (200-400km.)
These missile-based systems are relocatable, meaning the battery’s launchers, organic radars and command and control are mounted on platforms, either wheeled self-propelled or on trailers. However, these batteries takes time to breakdown and set-up. For example the Russian S-300 claims is claimed to be ready to fire from the march in under 15 minutes while a Patriot battery requires about one hour. Thus, they tend to operate where possible from a single fixed location. Each battery has its own radar for detection and targeting. The missiles generally use a high explosive warhead with proximity fusing although hit-to-kill capabilities have been provided in some, such as the Lockheed-Martin Patriot PAC- 3 version.
Reloading these launchers can be slow. However, design improvements reducing missile size have permitted increased numbers to be contained in each launcher with the Patriot PAC -2, for example, holding 16 vs the original PAC-1’s four. This is an important consideration as multiple missiles may be fired in an engagement to better assure a successful intercept. Area GBAD systems’ defence against tactical and cruise missiles have become increasingly a priority. Being based on ship-defence the SAMP/T’s Aster missile has demonstrated its effectiveness against both ballistic and missiles skimming sea/terrain as low as 10ft (3m).
Area GBAD is best conducted using layers of systems in depth, and are complemented by supporting medium range missile systems. These systems have less range but can have greater ground mobility being suited to truck mounting. In the area defence role they can act as gap fillers deployed to cover sectors masked by terrain or approach routes. The Kongsberg/Raytheon NASAMS is, as a representative explained, ideal for this mission “with its net centric architecture, multiple simultaneous engagements, Beyond Visual Range (BVR) capabilities, and the ability to integrate with a broader air and missile defence system.” This adaptability is further demonstrated by NASAMS’ compatibility with both the Raytheon AMRAAM ER for extended engagements and the AIM-9X-2 for shorter ranges. The ability to disburse battery functions across up to over 12 miles (20km) further facilitates its battlefield utility. Other representative systems include, but are not limited to, the Indo-Israeli developed Barak 8, Japan’s Type 03 Chu-SAM and Russian 9K37 BUK.
Point GBAD
Point GBAD encompass a broader range of GBAD systems in that the mission focuses on protecting a specific site, more suited to medium and shorter range systems as well as both stationary/trailered systems or mobile vehicle mounted systems. The challenge in point defence is that the target is fixed and have been well reconnoitred by the opponent who, therefore, knows the layout. In addition, it can be potentially targeted by a full range of aerial threats from UAVs to ground or air launched missiles, or attack aircraft. Their very different characteristics and attack profiles require GBAD capable to address each threat.
A number of GBAD system developers seek to accommodate this by incorporating the capability for a common launcher and control that can employ different missiles. The Rafael SPYDER family consists of short, medium and extended range capabilities that can be flexibly configured. Similarly, the IRIS-T (InfraRed Imaging System Tail/Thrust Vector-Controlled) uses both IRIS-T SLS for short range and medium-range IRIS-T SLM offering effective kill even against small manoeuvring aerial threats like UAVs and air launched munitions. The Iron Dome by Rafael and Israel Aerospace is a system optimised for point defence against rockets and shells. Its possibilities against UAVs has since also been demonstrated. Another approach to these threats is found in the Raytheon Coyote which could be described as an expendable UAS used to attack other UAVs when teamed with the KFRS radar.
Accompanying GBAD
Providing effective air defence for forward elements on the battlefield is one of the more difficult GBAD missions, particularly, for manoeuvring forces. To cover friendly forces GBAD assets must either move with them or repeatedly displace to new positions that extend their surveillance and weapons envelope. Recognising this systems like SAABs MSHORAD incorporate the threat search Giraffe radar, a multi-target RBS-70 RWS firing unit, and command and control on mobile platforms that can move with and continuously identify and counter various air threats. Another approach is to integrate air defence assets on to a single wheeled or tracked combat platform.
The General Dynamics/Leonardo DRS 8×8 Stryker based IM-SHORAD combines a XM-314 30mm autocannon, Stinger anti-air and Hellfire missiles, and RADA MultiHemispheric Radar (MHR) to provide this capability for the US Army. Rheinmetall Air Defence’s Skyranger draws from it successful stationary Skyguard GBAD offering a remote 35mm Oerlikon revolver gun turret with optional retracting missile pod. Dr. Moritz Vischer, product manager for Effectors shared that the system incorporates a S-band AESA Multi-Mission Radar and passive optical FIRST (Fast InfraRed Search and Track) for detection. Missile options include Stinger IR homing or the company’s Cheetah which can intercept rockets and even aerial dropped bombs. (The later could also be fitted into a container with 60 missiles available for fixed site defense.)
Non-Dedicated GBAD
The increasing presence of the UAVs provide not only an ability to directly attack, but also perhaps more damaging to discretely observe and target for other heavier weapons such as artillery and precision guided weapons. Traditional GBAD assets are able to address various aerial threats are inevitably an incomplete solution simply because they are limited in number. For example, a US Army air defence battalion has only18 IM-SHORADs to support a full division. The addition of the UAS coupled with the uncertainty of any one side achieving aerial dominance compounds the GRAD problem leaving forward units particularly at a disadvantage. Given the disbursed operations and granular nature anticipated on future battlefields, providing non-dedicated, particularly forward combat units, with ground air defence capabilities is crucial. Lacking these exposes them to increased casualties and can adversely impact on their ability to execute missions.
Several key technology developments combine to now allow offering ground combat units the ability to provide effective air defence capabilities. The first are the introduction of proximity fuzed and programable ammunition for direct fire weapons. The Rheinmetall “AHEAD” and Northrop-Grumman’s PABM provide air-bursting projectiles optimised for aerial targets. Available for a wide range of direct fire cannon including medium calibre auto-cannon, tank main guns, and even automatic grenade launchers, these advance munitions have proven to be able to down UAVs, drones, and low/slow aircraft with minimal rounds. Rylan Harris, Northrop-Grumman director for Advance Ammunition shared: “the 30mm PABM has been demonstrated to reliably defeat Group 1 and 2 UAVs operating in complex environments within the full effective range of the weapon often with a single shot.” NAMMO has demonstrated similar success with its 40mm RF airburst ammunition. The programable projectile also can the address a range of possible encountered threats quickly without changing the ammunition. The gunner is now able to specifically set for the optimum target effect just before firing. Thus, a single programmable round can fill roles previously requiring separate ammunition types.
The enhanced ability to acquire and accurately engage and hit targets provided by digital fire controls is another factor. These systems integrate range determination, acquisition, tracking, lead estimation, ballistics and ammunition setting, thereby, significantly enhancing the first round shot probability of the weapon it is associated with. Able to be compactly packaged allows for their use not only in combat vehicles but with infantry arms as well. Examples include the FN FCU Mk 5 and Rheinmetall FCS-MR800 for the shoulder-fired grenade launcher and the Israeli Smart Shooter each offer the infantryman the ability to engage and neutralise small drones. Coupling advanced sights with programable, air bursting ammunition gives forward combat units with credible organic counter-drone capability to the effective range of the weapon. Larger calibre weapons 30, 35, 40, and 50mm on combat vehicles can take on even larger threats.
A principle challenge for forward units in addressing the air threats they face on their own is their limited capability to detect them. This is particularly difficult with air platforms that operate at very low-level using terrain and other ground features for concealment such as the unmanned drone. While advanced sights especially thermal imagers can effectively acquire, their narrow field-of-view is not well suited to covering a wide horizon. This requirement is presently largely met by radar which are generally large, with high power demands and can be costly. Thus, they have been limited to dedicate GBAD platforms. Success has been demonstrated by panoramic Infrared Search and Track systems like the HGH Infrared Spynel and Rheinmetall FIRST which offer fully passive surveillance, however, despite advantages they are not yet widely adopted. Another promising option are Meta based radar technology, as developed by Echodyne. The company Vice President for Marketing Leo McCloskey explained “the electronically scanned array offers a small size and lower power needs, while offering both ground and air target detection and pointing accuracy at tactically relevant ranges (2.2km for a human).” Robert Menti, Northrop-Grumman Armaments Systems director of Business Development shared “our MACE demonstrator integrates Meta radar, electro-optic sighting, and appropriate computing and cueing of 30 mm guns or other effectors. Repeated live firings have validating the capabilities of this concept to successfully detect, acquire, track and destroy drones, as well as, other ground targets.” Of relevance for ground combat application is that the system’s tactical contribution applies to the full scope of ground combat unit targets of interest not simply aerial, thereby, further expanding situational awareness.
Coordinating GBAD
The broad area which enemy air operations can cover, the speed with which aircraft, missiles, drones and unmanned platforms are able to transit and the 360 degree attack potential demand the coordination of air defence assets on the battle are to effectively respond. The ability to collect and exchange data from not only distributed surveillance assets but also from other intelligence sources and engaged effector is a prerequisite to establishing and executing an integrated defence. Systems like the US Army FAADC2 (Forward Area Air Defense Command and Control) and IBCS (Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System) are intended to connect sensor and effectors on a single network. The vulnerability of these systems are the communication links that provide for the flow of data. However, as Jon Ferko, who’s company is providing the IBCS to the US Army and Poland’s Air and missile defence C2 program points out “because the integrated fire control network (IFCN) operates over IP networks, defense assets may be distributed and geographically dispersed creating redundancy, increasing survivability and by offering alternate data links should a communication node be lost. What remains unclear is how the introduction of drones and unmanned platforms and the defence against them can be incorporated into the current structure or if, given its diverse nature, it fits their templet at all.
GBAD In the Future
The battle space air threat has increased with the employment of precision guided missiles and munitions and unmanned vehicles and drones. This new dimension displays a unique relationship between air and ground interaction. Faced with this the traditional approach to ground air defence is exhibiting shortcoming. Not the least of these is the inherent dichotomy of firing multi-thousand-dollar effectors against a UAS costing hundreds of dollars or less. This broadening nature of the air threat is, however, consistent with a general overall homogeniSation of the battlespace. The definition of ground or air targets as separate “categories” is becoming increasingly less clear especially as one nears the forward battle area. Sensors detect both air and ground threats, weapon systems have the capability to effectively engage both, while networking allows presenting a common ground-air picture. The distinction between an “air battle” and “ground battle” is, partly thanks to the drone, becoming increasing artificial. Similarly, at least at the tactical level, GBAD may need to become a common combat capability inherent in some form integrated into combat platforms and/or organic to each unit. Similarly, however efficient current air defence networks may be the nature of the battlefield which includes UASs and drones may demand GBAD’s integration into a common battlefield picture . With the battlefield moving toward a more seamless convergence of air, ground and maritime, the conduct of air defence must follow.
by Stephen W. Miller
