Ukraine’s incursion into Russia’s Kursk oblast underscores the effectiveness of the former’s electronic warfare capabilities, but logistical challenges remain.
With over 8,800 dedicated Electronic Warfare (EW) personnel, the Ukrainian Army has arguably the largest EW land forces complement in the free world, according to a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) official working closely with it. This revelation was shared with Armada during the 2024 EWLive event held in the southern Estonian city of Tartu between 17th and 19th September. The official revealed that Ukrainian land forces had exhibited impressive coordination between its EW and kinetic units during the recent Kursk incursion. On 8th August, Ukrainian forces began their drive into Russia’s Kursk oblast. The region is northeast of the Russo-Ukrainian border.
As of mid-September, Ukrainian forces still appear in control of significant parts of the oblast. “They kept their game really tight,” observed the NATO official referring to coordination between EW and kinetic forces during manoeuvres supporting the incursion. The official continued that Ukrainian forces are exhibiting good Emissions Control (EMCOM) to protect their own communications against Russian jamming. Beyond EMCON, most of the EW effort of Ukrainian land forces focuses on the Counter-Uninhabited Aerial Vehicle (CUAV) battle. This battle is complicated by Russian land forces employing increasingly diverse frequencies for UAV control. These are often beyond the 2.4 gigahertz/GHz and 5.8GHz wavebands employed for civilian standard UAV pilotage. Ukrainian EW cadres have had to respond with CUAV systems which can monitor an ever-widening band of frequencies to spot these UAVs via the radio links connecting the aircraft with its pilot.
Deception and Teamwork
Ukrainian EW cadres have performed electromagnetic manoeuvre effectively. The official remarked that Ukrainian EW troops would perform deception attacks against Russian communications networks. These attacks distracted attention, convincing Russian forces that these networks were in the main schwerpunkt (focal point). Electronic deception is thought to have played a key role during the Kursk incursion.
Doctrinally, Ukraine’s land forces are deploying their EW troops in innovative ways. EW personnel are typically deployed at the tactical edge embedded with dismounted and mounted infantry, and armour. One or two EW personnel will be responsible for providing EW in support of these formations. The result is that numerous, dedicated EW troops are dispersed across the battlefield. Specialist EW formations are instead reserved for EW support at the high tactical/operational level.
Logistical challenges
Beyond the spectrum successes of the incursion, serious challenges exist for Ukrainian land forces EW cadres. The NATO official noted that EW materiel supplied by Ukraine’s allies had been welcomed. Nonetheless, a large, disparate collection of equipment causes concerns from an interoperability perspective. For example, Israeli EW equipment deployed into theatre might not meet NATO Standardisation Agreements (STANAGs). This may hamper its ability to work efficiently with equipment designed to these latter standards.
An additional problem is that the logistical support of this equipment remains patchy in some cases and non-existent in others. Ukraine’s allies have, on occasions, provided EW systems, but not spare parts or supporting logistical infrastructures. As a result, when equipment becomes unserviceable, it is often simply discarded. The NATO official urged countries providing EW kit to give logistical support to this end.
The Kursk incursion has underlined the impact of the electronic warfare acumen of Ukraine’s land forces. The incursion illustrates how effective EW can be once Ukrainian land forces are fighting fast manoeuvre warfare. This contrasts with the largely protective nature of the electronic warfare characterising the attritional combat seen across much of the front. A key takeaway from this phase of the conflict is that Ukraine’s allies need to increase the armaments they are sending to their ally. Alongside ensuring ammunition overmatch at Russia’s expense, fresh meaningful infusions of platforms, weapons and sensors could help Ukrainian get the land battle moving again. Clearly, electronic warfare capabilities provided by Ukrainian allies now need to be backed with comprehensive logistical support and issues regarding EW system compatibility must be urgently addressed. The Kursk incursion shows the difference EW can make when ground combat gets mobile. It is time for Ukraine’s supporters to recognise this and make sure their ally gets the EW and kinetic capabilities she so badly needs.
by Dr. Thomas Withington
