NATO and allied nations face a plethora of threats in the electromagnetic environment. This should concentrate the minds of policymakers.
The Association of Old Crows’ Electronic Warfare (EW) Europe conference and exhibition will open at 16.30 local time in Bonn, western Germany on 15th May. This will be precisely 445 days, twelve hours and 30 minutes since Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine on 24th February 2022. Ukraine has suffered war since February 2014 when Russia’s President Vladimir Putin performed his initial invasion.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is facing the prospect of a long war in Ukraine. Mr. Putin’s strategy appears to be one of inflicting attrition on the Ukrainian armed forces. He no doubt hopes that Western and wider international materiel support for Ukraine’s efforts eventually tire. The world’s economy faces a tough time. Inflation continues to squeeze businesses and populations. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) expects global inflation to cool to 6.6 percent in 2023. Further reductions are expected in 2024 to 4.3 percent. The IMF says this is lower than the 8.8 global inflation rate observed in 2022, but still below the 3.3 percent it observed before the Covid-19 pandemic which commenced in 2020.
Figures produced by the Statista research organisation say that between January 2022 and January 2023 Ukraine received a total of $156.5 billion in financial, humanitarian and military aid. This was supplied by 37 nations and the European Union. Alongside Ukraine’s own expenditure in blood and treasure, it could be argued that this is the annual cost to prevent Russia making further territorial gains in Ukraine. Will more money be forthcoming in the future? In September 2022, the World Bank warned that the global economy may head towards recession in 2023 as central banks increase interest rates to tame inflation. In January the polling organisation Ipsos published statistics on opinion regarding the war in Ukraine. In 28 countries an average of 57 percent of those interviewed said they supported “continuing to support Ukraine until all Russian forces have withdrawn from territory claimed by Ukraine”. 48 percent “favour(ed) providing weapons and/or air defence systems to the Ukrainian military.” These statistics depict slender majorities and minorities. This could risk NATO and wider international support for Ukraine. Reducing the provision of materiel to Ukraine risks handing Russia the operational and strategic initiative. Reducing defence spending across NATO risks depriving militaries of the electronic attack, protection and support capabilities they need to counter hostile electromagnetically-dependent systems.
Over the great wall
Russia is not NATO’s only strategic preoccupation. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is looming ever larger. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg warned in early April that “any provision of lethal aid by China to Russia would be an historic mistake, with profound implications.” Media reports stated that unnamed US officials do not believe the PRC has yet supplied any lethal military equipment to Russia. Nonetheless Dr. Maria Shagina, Diamond-Brown Senior Research Fellow for Economic Sanctions, Standards and Strategy at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), a London-based thinktank, has warned that the PRC maybe supplying advanced semiconductor technology to Russia.
Russia needs technology for its kit. In 2022 the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), another London-based thinktank, published Silicon Lifeline: Western Electronics at the Heart of Russia’s War Machine. RUSI’s researchers examined captured and destroyed Russian equipment in the Ukraine theatre of operations. They determined that 27 modern Russian weapons systems contained at least 450 unique foreign-made components. Russian systems examined included communications systems, EW equipment and missiles. Foreign-made components included microelectronics produced in France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, the Republic of Korea, Switzerland, Taiwan, the United Kingdom and the United States. Some of these components were not subjected to national or international export controls and hence acquired legally in the past prior to sanctions imposed on Russia following the 2014 Ukraine invasion. Others were acquired through illegal channels. In August 2022 US President Joe Biden’s administration imposed new sanctions on the sales of some computer chips to the PRC and Russia. This could hamper Russia’s ability to build some of the sophisticated weapons she is using in Ukraine. It could frustrate China’s attempts to source and export these components to Russia. It could also help frustrate both countries’ wider military modernisation ambitions.
Modernisation – China
NATO’s electronic warfare enterprise, the collective name for any person, organisation or business contributing to the alliance’s overall EW posture, must consider ongoing military electromagnetic modernisation in Russia and the PRC. These modernisation efforts will yield capabilities that may need to be engaged, and defended against, by the alliance’s spectrum warriors in future conflicts.
Norm Wade’s Chinese Military: Forces, Operations and Tactics is a good, open-source discussions of PRC military modernisation. Mr. Wade writes that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as China’s armed forces are collectively known, wants to accelerate its “informatisation and intelligentisation” by 2027. This rests on improving the networking of its armed forces. It also rests on improving the speed and efficiency of how information flows around these networks. These ambitions will manifest themselves at the materiel level through improvements to PLA communications hardware and software. This may see the introduction of technologies like cognitive radio. Similarly, offensive cyber capabilities at all levels of war loom large in PLA doctrine.
Strategic and operational information warfare capabilities including cyber, electronic, psychological and space warfare, are the preserve of the PLA’s Strategic Support Force (SSF). The SSF is a separate combatant command. Mr. Wade underscores that the SSF’s primary mission is “systems warfare” which focuses on using these vectors to attack adversary military systems and networks.
The idea of having integrated communications from strategic through to operational and down to tactical levels is a relatively new concept for the PLA. Mr. Wade writes that PLA ground forces “historically did not seek to integrate tactical echelons into a wider communications architecture; the division was the first echelon with a robust communications capability. Lower echelons relied on a combination of close proximity to headquarters and couriers to meet their communications needs, with battalions as the lowest echelon to employ modernised radios.”
PLA ground forces are pursuing an ongoing force-wide overhaul of their communications. Mr Wade says the ground forces’ “desired end state is likely to have every squad or patrol equipped with a secure, reliable radio communications capability and to extend a secure, reliable network data capability down to the platoon.” Current PLA land forces tactical radio systems are said to be analogous to the Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System, between known as SINCGARS, used throughout NATO. Other aspects of Chinese military communications are assessed as relatively basic. The PLA is said to suffer shortfalls in dedicated military satellite communications and non-line of sight radio. This includes wideband High Frequency (HF: three megahertz to 30MHz) and tactical tropospheric radio. Tactical Datalink (TDL) provision is thought to be basic at best. For example, the PLA is implementing an air operations TDL like NATO’s Link-16. However, this is thought to be in its infancy and some years away from achieving an initial operational capability.
The PLA has clear aspirations to address such deficiencies and significantly overhaul how its forces distribute information. In late 2022, the US Department of Defence (DOD) published its annual assessment of the PLA; Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China. This revealed a fledgling a cross-domain Command and Control (C2) architecture akin to the United States’ Joint All-Domain C2 system (JADC2). JADC2 federates several disparate operational and strategic level C2 systems used by America’s individual armed services. JADC2 plans the inter- and intra-force networking of every warfighter, platform, weapon, base, sensor and capability, collectively known as assets, at all levels of war to improve the speed and quality of military decision-making.
The PLA’s ambitions do not simply reflect a strategic desire to ‘keep up with the Joneses’ as far as US JADC2 aspirations are concerned. The DOD’s report remarks that the PLA is keen to penetrate and disrupt an adversary’s decision-making cycle during hostilities. Developing a JADC2-style capability for the PLA is intended to destroy “the adversary’s ability to acquire, transmit and process information while simultaneously protecting the PLA’s ability to do the same.” Chinese military theorists keenly watched US-led post-Cold War operations particularly those in the Balkans, Iraq and Libyan theatres. One lesson for the PLA was that victory is secured by attacking hostile C2 systems and communications networks. The PLA believes “that it can successfully deter and manage a conflict by either controlling or destroying an adversary’s access to information.” Modernising its’ own communications, using the SSF and implementing a JADC2-style doctrine are three vectors the PLA will employ to achieve this ambition.
Modernisation – Russia
Mr. Putin’s government was 14 years into a modernisation of Russia’s armed forces when it launched the second invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Dubbed the ‘New Look’, these reforms aimed to address the atrophy suffered by the country’s military since the Cold War and Russia’s ensuing decline into economic chaos. The State Armament Programme was launched in 2011 with a planned completion for 2020. IISS published a report on Russian military modernisation on the eve of Russia’s 2022 Ukraine invasion. It said that three factors influenced the revamp of the country’s military: The first was the performance of her armed forces during the 2008 invasion of Georgia. An assessment written in 2018 by Michael Kofman, an expert on the Russian military, said that that “the war revealed profound deficiencies in the Russian armed forces … Moscow was surprised by the poor performance of its airpower, and more importantly, the inability of different services to work together … The conflict uncovered glaring gaps in capability, problems with command and control, and poor intelligence.” The factor flagged by IISS was an uptick in remittances for hydrocarbon exports providing the finance for the reforms. CEIC Data said Russian gas exports rose from 193.9 million cubic metres in 2012 to a 2019 peak of 262.4 million cubic metres. The third factor was Mr. Putin’s perception of the existential he perceives Russia poses to NATO. One year before the invasion of Georgia, Mr. Putin argued in a speech presented at the Munich Security Conference that NATO expansion “does not have any relation with the modernisation of the Alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual treat … (w)e have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended?”
The fruits of this modernisation are seen on the charred Ukrainian landscape. The Russian military has suffered casualties of up to 200,000 according to the United kingdom’s Ministry of Defence. IISS figures say size of the Russian Army’s manoeuvre force was circa 300,000 in 2021. The oryxspioenkop.com website cataloguing Russian equipment losses estimates her land forces may have lost almost 2,000 Main Battle Tanks (MBTs). The force’s pre-war strength was circa 3,300 MBTs. This is not to say the Russian military is a spent force. Ukraine may have suffered up to 120,000 casualties according to figure published by The Washington Post in March 2023.
In late 2022, Roger McDermott, an expert on the Russian military, published his seminal work Russia’s Path to the High-Tech Battlespace. This chronicles the ambitions of Russia’s military to turn the country’s armed forces into a sophisticated networked entity capable of defeating NATO and allied nations. Mr. McDermott warns that “the adoption, integration and role of high-technology assets in Russia’s armed forces is presently underestimated in both Washington and NATO.” Russian military theory emphasises the importance of information superiority as a force multiplier. Robust networks will connect assets and decision-makers to improve situational awareness and synchronisation. This is intended to quicken C2 and hence battle tempo thus increasing survivability.
Russian land forces continue to induct new tactical radios in the guise of the R-187P/N Azart, P-168 Akveduk and P-187BV handheld, vehicular and fixed transceivers. One problem experienced by these radios in the Ukraine theatre of operations is an inability to link with legacy transceivers. This is because common waveforms do not appear to be available to use across the land forces’ fleet of existing radios. Meanwhile, automated C2 systems are being introduced in the Russian military, the Andromeda-D battle management system for the country’s airborne forces being one noteworthy example. Furthermore, the Russian Army has embraced the tactical utility of Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). To this end, it has been an enthusiastic user of the Orlan-10 UAV and militarised, civilian UAVs.
Russian technological investments in the electromagnetic sphere are not confined to the realm of communications, they are mirrored in the radar domain. At least three kills are attributed to Russian S-400 (NATO reporting name SA-21 Growler) long-range, high-altitude surface-to-air missile batteries deployed by the Russia’s army and air force to Ukraine. An S-400 battery typically uses 91N6 (NATO reporting name Big Bird) S-band, 92N6E (NATO reporting name Grave Stone) X-band (8.5GHz to 10.68GHz) and 96L6/E (NATO reporting name Cheese Board) C-band ground-based air surveillance and fire control radars. Meanwhile, new radars are being rolled out across the Russian Air and Space Force’s (RASF) IADS. These include the Resonance-N/NE Very High Frequency (VHF: 35 megahertz/MHz to 70MHz) and 12A6 Sopka-2 S-band ground-based air surveillance radars. Confidential sources have shared with Armada that the Su-35S (NATO reporting name Flanker-E) Irbis-E X-band radar has been the most effective look-down, shoot-down system deployed by the RASF in Ukraine.
Much like the deployment of advanced communications into the Ukraine theatre of operations, the EW capabilities of Russia’s armed forces have at times appeared lacklustre. Ukrainian Army sources have said Russian Army tactical EW units have struggled to successfully jam US-supplied SINCGARS radios. Russian air power did not appear to complete its suppression/destruction of Ukraine’s IADS. This continues to be capable of detecting incoming air attacks and warning the Ukrainian population. It is possible that the radars and communications the IADS depends on are still largely functioning. Attacks against SpaceX Starlink SATCOM terminals supplied to Ukraine have primarily rested on cyberattacks. These have been quickly remedied and suggest that the Russian armed forces cannot jam the Ku-band (twelve gigahertz to 18GHz) and Ka-band (27GHz to 40GHz) radio channels Starlink depends on. Outside the Ukrainian theatre, NATO has experienced Global Navigation Satellite Signal (GNSS) jamming in its high north and Arctic regions. This has been blamed on Russian EW forces located in northwest Russia close to the country’s borders with Finland and Norway.
Russian EW should not be written off entirely. Ukrainian sources have shared that Russian jamming is highly effectively against unencrypted radio links connecting UAVs to their ground control stations. The jamming is similar capable against the unencrypted GNSS signals these aircraft depend on. The Russian armed forces are likely to continue to see EW as a key doctrinal component across all services. As Mr. McDermott writes Russian military thought stresses the imperative to jam at least 30 percent of an opposing forces’ electromagnetically-dependent systems. This is thought sufficient to render opposing forces unable to continue the fight.
From here …
Russia’s EW capabilities may have underwhelmed in Ukraine, but this does not warrant complacency on the part of NATO and allied militaries. Russia is continuing to deepen the networking of her armed forces even as the war continues to rage in Ukraine. The country’s military is introducing advanced radars and radios much like the PLA. China, like Russia, places information warfare, which cyber and electronic warfare are key components of, front and centre in her military doctrines. Both countries will work hard to secure the sophisticated electronics and components they need to make these aspirations a reality.
NATO and allied nations could face twin restraints of declining defence budgets amid a global recession and declining public support in some quarters for the continued materiel support of Ukraine. These factors could have a detrimental effect on NATO security writ large, and on procuring the advanced CEMA (Cyber and Electromagnetic Activities) capabilities alliance members need to hold hostile electromagnetically-dependent systems at risk, while safeguarding their own. In the rest of this supplement experts from across NATO’s CEMA enterprise will share their thoughts on how to tackle these electric shocks.
by Dr. Thomas Withington
