NATO’s Multi-Domain Operations posture comes under scrutiny during this year’s Riga Conference held in the Latvian Capital.
The sun poured through the windows of the delightful National Museum of Latvia situated on the banks of the Daugava River, the venue for this year’s Riga Conference held between 17th and 19th October. One side event was a panel examining Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) readiness on the Eastern Flank. This event was sponsored by Globsec, a think tank based in Bratislava, Slovakia. Globsec has recently published a report entitled Connect to Succeed: Multi-Domain Operations Readiness on the Eastern Flank.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is embracing Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) and details on how NATO defines MDO can be found here. Marcin Zaborowski, Globsec’s distinguished fellow for the future of security programme, retired Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, former commander of the United States Army in Europe, and Martin Sklenár, former minister of defence of the Slovak Republic, and a Globsec distinguished fellow, comprised the panellists. They asserted that what differentiates MDO from joint operations is the addition of the space and cyber domains into the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war alongside the traditional sea, land and air domains. A key message of the panel discussions is that MDO must be integral to how NATO fights, trains and organises.
All panellists agreed that the Ukrainian armed forces are today are conducting MDO in that country’s fight against Russian occupation. The Ukrainian military is operating in the land, maritime and air environments, alongside the space and cyber domains. The country’s armed forces are performing operations at depth, for example striking Russian oil and gas infrastructure, while continuing to perform tactical and operational tasks. These efforts are depending on a heavily congested electromagnetic environment contested by Russian electronic warfare.
Instruments of national power
A key discriminator for the alliance’s multidomain operations vision, compared to that of the US Department of Defence, is the centrality of so-called instruments of national power. Military operations demand a constant search for the best effect, but that effect might not always originate from the military. Perhaps it is possible to employ political effects such as sanctions, which could have a military consequence? Sanctions on the import of advanced technology, could negatively affect the quality and quantity of weapons an adversary can deploy. However, this reality must be set against the risk that there may be a lack of awareness in government regarding MDO utility and its organisation. Government, critical national infrastructure, the public and private sector, and civil society are arguably all domains in their own way.
There can be a tendency for some armed forces to build up new siloed capabilities in different domains. Bureaucratic structures, plus service rivalries, can act as a restraint on the implementation of the MDO mindset. Is capability acquisition conducted across the alliance with MDO as a key consideration? The three Baltic nations of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are currently building the Baltic Defence Line fortifications. These fortifications will protect their borders against any armed incursions from Russia and Belarus. Ensuring high levels of inter- and intra-force operability will be vital to ensuring that the line is robust.
Making MDO a reality
Arguments were made at the event that NATO’s MDO plans and requirements should be front and centre vis-à-vis training across the alliance. It is not always natural for services to want to work together, but it must be emphasised that the sum can be greater than its parts strategically, operationally and tactically. Training should reflect the need to use integrated effects in a multinational environment should war with Russia erupt. The alliance needs to be ready for Russia’s own interpretation of the MDO philosophy. There is every chance in a future war that the Russian military will launch missile strikes against NATO transportation targets. Russian commanders realise that NATO’s response to any aggression depends on rapidly reinforcing the Baltic. Transportation targets will likely be hit with cyberattacks as well as kinetic effects. NATO units might have to fight for up to two weeks before NATO reinforcements appear en masse in the Baltic.
Delegates and panellists had some simple, but indispensable, advice for NATO as it embraces MDO: Governments and militaries should prioritise connectivity and get the best value from investments they are already making. The alliance should be making clear to Russia that it is well prepared for war and continually improving this preparedness. Last, but by no means least, militaries need to ensure they have robust, redundant and secure networking, and to realise that this connectivity can itself be a potent effect.
by Dr. Thomas Withington
