Project Morpheus, the next generation of Tactical Communication and Information Systems (TacCIS) for the United Kingdom’s land manoeuvre forces is not going well. Is a less ambitious alternative the answer in terms of delivery time and cost?
The communications element of the UK’s Project Morpheus initiative is in trouble. Is it time to kill the programme and opt for a more conventional, and less risky, tactical radio procurement?
The news from Oakdale, South Wales was grim in early August. The town is home to the headquarters of the United Kingdom division of General Dynamics (GD). In 2017 the company won the so-called EVO (Evolve-to-Open) contract from the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD). EVO forms part of the UK’s Project Morpheus Tactical Communications and Information System (TACCIS) which replaces the existing Bowman TACCIS. A report by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) said that the in-service date for Morpheus was 2025. It now seems all but certain that this will not be achieved leaving the programme in a state of flux. The BBC report articulated that the MOD is unhappy with Morpheus’ progress and that the initiative is now under review. Project Morpheus created several hundred jobs for Oakdale, the BBC report continued. These jobs could now be at risk which is bad news for Wales as a whole. According to the Statista research company, unemployment in Wales was 4.6 percent between January and March 2023. This rate compares unfavourably with the 3.5 percent for the same period the year before. Any major downsizing or outright cancellation of the programme could be devastating for the local Welsh economy. That the Morpheus programme is in a world of hurt is not in doubt, but how did we get here?
Ambition
Morpheus began life as an overarching MoD effort to develop a new communications system for the UK’s land manoeuvre forces. These forces include the land manoeuvre elements of the British Army, the Royal Marines and Royal Air Force Regiment. The organisation of the Morpheus effort is bewildering at best. The programme falls under the UK Land Environment Tactical Communications and Information System (LETACCIS) effort. Three organisations are tasked with delivering LETACCIS: UK Strategic Command, British Army Headquarters and the MoD’s Tactical Systems Service Executive. LETACCIS has two elements of which Morpheus is one. The other element is known as ‘Networks’. Networks includes Trinity and Niobe. Trinity is replacing the army’s Falcon trunk communications system with a deployable Wide Area Network (WAN). Niobe rolls out a raft of new tactical/operational level Command and Control (C2) elements from company/battalion to corps level. Niobe’s respective C2 elements will share their communications traffic up and down echelons using Trinity.
At the tactical level, Morpheus will provide communications and C2 elements. The communications elements including associated radios and radio networks. The C2 elements include software applications for command and control, a tablet-hosted battle management system and a Joint Common Remote Viewing Terminal (JCRVT). The JCRVT will provide troops with a way to view imagery.
UK land manoeuvre forces currently use the Bowman communications and C2 system. Bowman had its share of difficulties when it was under development. These problems led to some soldiers joking that Bowman was in fact an acronym for ‘Better off with Map and Nokia’. The Bowman architecture has probably gone as far as it can. The system’s last major enhancement saw the integration of the Common Battlefield Application Toolset. Known as COMBAT which GD integrated into the Bowman architecture, the system’s prime contractor. COMBAT became the main element of the current Bowman architecture configuration. This configuration is known as Bowman Combat Infrastructure and Platform 5.6; BCIP 5.6 for short.
From the outset, the MoD has been adamant that it does not want a large, complex system provided by a single, or a small number, of dedicated defence contractors. The logic was that this would avoid the ministry being reliant on a finite number of contractors every time Morpheus needed new capabilities or enhancements. The MoD believed this would allow it to approach an array of contractors, military and civilian alike, when enhancements and upgrades for Morpheus would be required. Such an approach it was hoped would stimulate competition and hence encourage would-be suppliers to offer competitively priced solutions. In the words of one senior government official with intimate knowledge of Morpheus, “we won’t ever buy a large monolithic system again. The future isn’t there.”
It is interesting that France has elected to continue with this monolithic approach with Thales’s front and centre of its CONTACT (Communications Numérisées Tactique et de Théâtre/Digital Tactical and Theatre Communications) progamme. Likewise, efforts in the US to overhaul land manoeuvre forces communications focuses on a relatively small number of traditional suppliers. To this end the Handheld, Manpack Small Form Factor (HMS) undertaking includes Collins Aerospace, GD, L3Harris and Thales. It will be interesting to see if Morpheus does yield savings to the taxpayer over the long term by encouraging supplier competition. Alternatively, will the arguably more traditional, tactical communications procurements in France, the US and elsewhere be just as good, if not better, value for money?
Complexity
At the core of the UK MoD’s approach to Morpheus is the so-called Single Information Environment (SIE). Basically, the ministry wants to buy tactical communications hardware and software from a host of traditional and non-traditional suppliers. The philosophy behind this approach is that all this disparate kit and software applications will integrate seamlessly onto a common architecture. SIE was to be realised via EVO. According to evidence presented in January 2023 to the House of Commons Defence Select Committee, EVO was to deliver “a lab-tested baseline system, which will employ open architectures and will set the conditions for the wider Morpheus project to be vendor independent.” The Select Committee is a cross-party parliamentary group scrutinising government defence policy.
EVO was to provide the MoD with the foundation for this open tactical network by taking the existing ‘closed’ Bowman architecture and making it open. As mentioned above, the idea was to ensure the ministry could easily integrate new hardware and software onto this network as and when needed. Your cellphone can be used as an analogy to how the MoD views Bowman at present, and how it would like Morpheus to look. Imagine that you had to pay your cellphone manufacturer or network provider to integrate a new software application, or ancillary device like headphones, each time you downloaded or purchased them. This is arguably how the MOD sees Bowman and other ‘monolithic’ tactical communications programmes. By using this approach, the ministry must go back to the contractor and pay them each time it wants to integrate a new capability. The Morpheus philosophy is more like a smartphone. The MoD owns the smartphone, in this case the network architecture, and can easily integrate any new capabilities it wants. In essence, the ministry will pay for new capabilities, but not have to pay for the integration. This approach will depend on a set of standards that any adornment for Morpheus must adhere to.
GD was subsequently contracted to provide EVO. The company was judged to be in the best position to ensure that Bowman’s closed architecture could be converted into an open standard. To clarify, GD appears to have only been tasked to deliver a laboratory tested open architecture as part of the contract. It is important to stress that EVO was not to yield a system that could be fielded. Industry sources familiar with the programme say that there is dispute as to whether GD has delivered EVO’s laboratory-tested architecture. Both the MoD and GD are said to be in ongoing discussions regarding this lab-tested architecture.
Where does Morpheus go from here? It is hard to say. The first problem is that the existing Bowman communications system is not getting any younger, having entered service in 2004. Bowman was originally scheduled for retirement in 2026, although with Morpheus seemingly stuck, this now seems unlikely. Can a few more years be eked out of Bowman? They might have to be. However, there will come a point where the MoD has no choice but to replace the communications element of Bowman with a new system. Not only is this need driven by obsolescence it is also driven by doctrine.
In 2020, the MoD published its Joint Concept Note 1/20 Multi Domain Integration and the Integrated Operating Concept. This publication outlines how the UK defence enterprise will embrace emerging Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) philosophies. The United States military is forging the MDO path. MDO envisages the inter- and intra-force connection of all military assets (personnel, platforms, weapons, sensors, bases and capabilities) to perform synchronous operations at all levels of war. The goal of MDO is to gather, exploit and disseminate data of a better quality and at a faster pace than one’s adversary.
The UK’s approach arguably takes things further. The doctrine of Multi-Domain Integration (MDI) applies these levels of connectivity to the country’s defence enterprise. The defence enterprise comprises all government departments; private sector and industry; academia and research organisations and elements of civil society involved in defence. MDI, like its multi-domain operations counterpart, places a heavy emphasis on data. Ensuring that data is moved around the battlespace as quickly, securely and efficiently as possible places a heavy burden on communications. This brings two challenges: MDI herald a growth in communications links on and off the battlefield. A host of military assets not previously networked will now be connected to each other. This level of connectivity will demand corresponding network density. The second challenge will be to ensure these links can handle the exponential growth of data moved around the defence enterprise on and off the battlefield. Bowman’s successor will form but one element of the wider UK communications architecture needed to underpin MDI as illustrated by the Trinity procurement. Nonetheless, it seems doubtful that Bowman in its current form can meet these demands. To be blunt, the MoD has no choice but to procure a new tactical communications system for the UK’s land manoeuvre forces as quickly as possible.
Options
What should the MoD do? Senior MoD sources have told Armada that the plan continues to be focused on a baseline tactical communications open architecture. The business model is for the MoD to announce a specific requirement. A company could then tender to provide this capability and may then subcontract another firm to deliver it. This might help small and medium-sized firms who have developed a specific software application, for example, but do not have the heft to upscale their offering. A good example of this approach was seen during the early days of the Morpheus initiative. In 2015 PA Consulting, arguably a non-traditional defence supplier, was awarded a contract to help define Morpheus. The company was leading a team of firms including QinetiQ, Roke Manor Research and CGI. A company like PA Consulting could act as the intermediary between the MoD and a smaller company to supply the desired capability.
That said, a general election is in the offing which must be held by 24 January 2025, according to UK law. This will not only bring a new government but could also bring a change in governing party. The opposition Labour Party is the current favourite to win the next election, leading the governing Conservative Party by 20 percent. These figures were derived from an aggregated poll from Politico published in mid-August. Any change of government will bring a change in the political leadership of the MOD and a likely refresh of defence policy. There is the very real prospect that Morpheus in its current form could be axed. A 2022 report published by the UK’s National Audit Office, an independent organisation which examines government spending, said the MoD had already spent $517 million on the initiative. Would a Labour government decide to put the programme out of its misery and take a fresh approach?
A source close to Labour Party defence policymaking told Armada that several established tactical communications companies are already pushing for the MoD to take a more traditional approach to Morpheus. This could see one, or several, tactical communications suppliers providing the MoD with a suite of radios and associated software to furnish the UK land manoeuvre force. France’s CONTACT programme is already being seen as a possible candidate. The asset of CONTACT is that it is in production and being delivered. The MoD could ask the French government to buy into the programme. It could take the same hardware and software, but tailor these for UK requirements. Thales already has a significant presence in the UK, so it might even be able to produce a large part, if not all, of the hardware and software domestically. This might help offset any job losses suffered by GD and generate skilled, high technology jobs in the UK. Having using similar radio technology to the French armed forces could help to foster interoperability between them and the UK military. The two countries already cooperate closely on defence matters, as shown by the 2010 Lancaster House Treaties. These pledged France and the UK to deepen their defence industrial, nuclear deterrent and military cooperation. Likewise, L3Harris, which also has a substantial presence in the UK, is said to have urged the MoD to take a more traditional approach.
It is impossible to say at the time of writing (September 2023) what the ministry will do but one thing seems certain. Morpheus in its current guise seems unlikely to deliver the desired results at a time when the UK’s land manoeuvre forces desperately need new communications. “We’ve spent millions on Morpheus and have nothing to show for it,” said the source close to the Labour Party. Militarily, financially and politically continued inertia regarding UK land manoeuvre force communications is simply not an option.
by Thomas Withington
