A bureaucratic reorganisation in one of China’s combatant commands may be indicative of problems and challenges the Chinese military is experiencing in modernising its military communications.
In what has become an annual tradition the United States Department of Defence (DOD) released its 2024 Military and Security Developments involving the People’s Republic of China Annual Report to Congress in late December. In its own words the document “charts the course of the PRC’s national, economic, and military strategy and offers insight on the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) strategy, current capabilities, and activities as well as its future modernisation goals.”
The document remains a useful source, providing an authoritative snapshot of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) strategic goals and foreign policy objectives, defence and security priorities, military force structures and military modernisation goals. The report articulates observations regarding People’s Liberation Army (PLA) efforts to overhaul its strategic, operational and tactical military communications.
Writ large, the report states that the PLA “has sought to modernise its capabilities and improve its proficiencies across all warfare domains to become a joint force capable of the full range of land, air, and maritime as well as nuclear, space, counterspace, electronic warfare and cyberspace operations.” This quotation underscores how communications modernisation is central to the PRC’s embrace of the Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) philosophy. The PLA’s version of MDO is termed Multi-Domain Precision Warfare. It exploits “command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance … network that incorporates advances in big data and AI (Artificial Intelligence).” The strategic objective of Multi-Domain Precision Warfare is to “rapidly identify key vulnerabilities in the US operational system and then combine joint forces across domains to launch precision strikes against those vulnerabilities.”
Information Support Force
One of the most dramatic illustrations of Chinese military communications modernisation has been the reorganisation of the erstwhile PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF). The SSF is no more, having been dissolved by China’s Central Military Commission (CMC) in April 2024. In the alphabet soup of Chinese military acronyms, the CMC is the PRC’s supreme politico-military leadership. Why the SSF was dissolved remains unknown. The report speculates that “(t)he … decision to dissolve the SSF after only eight years reveals compelling concerns over its contribution to joint operational effectiveness as well as severely inefficient management and leadership.” The report cites several changes in SSF leadership between 2023 and 2024 which may indicate concerns over the SSF’s leadership and management. The coordination and management of the PLA’s military communications now falls within Information Support Force (ISF). The ISF is directly subordinate to the CMC, as was the SSF. The status of the ISF is analogous to a combatant command in the US military.
The SSF had three directorates: The Network Systems Department (NSD) was responsible for cyberwarfare, electronic warfare, information warfare, technical reconnaissance and psychological warfare. The SSF’s Space Systems Department (SSD) was responsible for the PLA’s use of space, and counterspace activities. Finally, the Information Communications Base was the custodian of PLA communications networks and was responsible for defending these networks. The SSD and NSD have been moved out of the ISF and are now under the Central Military Commission’s direct control. However, the Information Communications Base is thought to continue as a constituent part of the ISF headquartered in Beijing.
It remains to be seen what effect the SSF disbandment and ISF activation will have on the PLA’s military communications capabilities. To paraphrase the quotation of Zhou Enlai, Chinese Communist Party ideologue and PRC stateman when asked about the consequences of the 1789 French Revolution, it is probably too soon to say. On the one hand, the reorganisation reflects the PLA’s commitment to continue prioritising communications modernisation and investment. On the other hand, SSF leadership problems may have adversely affected the pace and quality of PLA military communications modernisation. Time will tell.
by Dr. Thomas Withington
