On the evening of 11 January 2024, United States and United Kingdom forces conducted offensive strike operations against Ansar Allah (Houthi) rebel targets ashore in Yemen.
The US Navy (USN) launched Tomahawk cruise missiles from destroyers, and F/A-18 Hornet strike aircraft from the carrier USS Dwight D Eisenhower; the UK Royal Air Force launched Typhoon strike aircraft from the UK’s forward base at Akrotiri, Cyprus. Sixteen rebel targets were struck across six locations in Western Yemen. The targets included air-defence sites, logistics nodes, weapons storage facilities, and airfields and supporting buildings.
The following evening, US forces conducted further strikes, targeting more air-defence sites with Tomahawks.
Announcing the decision to conduct the operation, US president Joe Biden said: “These strikes are in direct response to unprecedented Houthi attacks against international maritime vessels in the Red Sea – including the use of anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) for the first time in history.”
A UK government statement said the operation was “a carefully co-ordinated strike [designed] to reduce the Houthis’ capability to violate international law in this manner”.
Following the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war on 7 October, in mid-November the Houthis began launching attacks in the southern Red Sea against commercial ships that the rebels claimed were visiting Israeli ports.
As international concern rose regarding the impact of the Houthi attacks on freedom of navigation for commercial shipping in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the connecting Bab-al-Mandeb straits, the USN-led Operation Prosperity Guardian (OPG) task force was established as a defensive measure to deter and defend against the threat, which included cruise missiles, and uncrewed air and surface systems, alongside ASBMs.
As the attacks continued nonetheless over the following weeks, a separate group of countries – led again by the United States – issued a statement on 3 January warning the Houthis that continued attacks would precipitate a response. The attacks continued, and the response was forthcoming.
The offensive response was conducted not only because attacks were continuing, but because they were increasing in capability and scale. The uptick in this capability was demonstrated both by the first use of an ASBM, and by the first use (in this crisis) of uncrewed surface vessels.
A few days prior to the US and UK conducting offensive strikes, the increasing scale of the air-defence requirement for OPG ships was underlined when US and UK destroyers shot down 18 uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) and three missiles, in what was reported to have been the largest Houthi attack to date. In its statement, the UK government noted that US and UK naval ships had been deliberately targeted on that occasion.
As regards the defensive operations conducted under OPG, the incoming threat has been dealt with so far by seven multinational destroyers and frigates: five USN Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, the US Ships Carney, Gravely, Thomas Hudner, Laboon, and Mason; the UK Royal Navy Type 45 destroyer HMS Diamond; and the French Navy’s FREMM frigate FS Languedoc.
These ships have used a range of different systems during OPG’s defensive activities: Carney, for example, has fired its Raytheon Standard Missile (SM)-2 surface-to-air missile (SAM) capability; Diamond has fired its MBDA Aster 30-based Sea Viper SAMs, while also using gun-based naval fires; Languedoc has used its MBDA Aster 15 SAMs. In some instance, these navies were using these capabilities for the first time in combat operations.
While the nature of the threat has in some senses been unprecedented, for example as a sustained campaign conducted by a non-state actor evidently able to access large numbers of different weapons, the Houthis appear to be struggling to generate effective operations, including establishing a networked command, control, and communications (C3) capability. For example, in a 4 January media briefing, Vice Admiral Brad Cooper – the USN’s Bahrain-based, triple-hatted Commander of US Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT), US Fifth Fleet, and the USN-led Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) multinational maritime security coalition – said the Houthis’ first USV use ended with the vessel exploding while still a couple of miles from the nearest ship. Moreover, he noted, between 18 December and 4 January none of the Houthi UAVs or missiles hit any merchant vessels.
Using an effective C3 and targeting network is a critical overlayer in contemporary military operations. In this context, it is worth noting that coalition officials are characterising the Houthi attacks that use a number of weapons as waves, rather than swarms, as the incoming weapons are arriving simply en masse rather than operating with any co-ordinated, integrated manoeuvrability.
At the time of writing in mid-January, US Central Command (CENTCOM) has reported continuing – but maybe more sporadic – Houthi activities. However, the rebels’ operational problems appear to be continuing too.
On 11 January, an ASBM was fired in what CENTCOM numbered the 27th attack: in a social media post, CENTCOM stated that: “One commercial vessel reported visually observing the missile impact the water.”
On 14 January, an anti-ship cruise missile was fired towards Laboon. US fighter aircraft shot it down, CENTCOM reported.
On 15 January, CENTCOM reported that an ASBM fired towards the shipping lanes failed in flight and landed in Yemen, and that another ASBM struck a ship in the Gulf of Aden but that the ship was able to continue its journey with no significant damage suffered.
It remains to be seen what Houthi intention, or capability, remains after these actions.
by Dr. Lee Willett
