The US Army is digesting lessons learned from the ongoing war in Ukraine concerning command post survivability, lessons which have implications for tactical communications deployment.
Although published this February, the US Army’s Centre for Lessons Learned (CALL) publication entitled Lessons Learned from the Ukrainian Territorial Defense Forces: Command Post Survivability, only recently came to Armada’s attention. This document is based on wider observations articulated in the CALL publication entitled Battalion Command and Observation Posts: Practical Advice Based on War Experiences. It does not appear the latter publication has been made available to the public domain.
Using observations of Ukraine’s experience protecting her deployed command posts, the Lessons Learned publication stresses that “US Army leaders and soldiers should consider these CP (Command Post) survival lessons and best practices to improve their ability to survive on the modern battlefield.” The document continues that a key challenge to Ukrainian CP survivability has been Russian Electronic Warfare (EW).
According to the publication, Ukrainian command posts are routinely positioned at between two and five kilometres/km (1.2 and 3.1 miles), and ten kilometres (6.2 miles), behind the frontline. Anecdotal evidence from Ukraine suggests that Russian land forces can turn a geolocated and identified Ukrainian military communications signal into an artillery aimpoint within minutes. As a result, electromagnetic concealment for forward-deployed command posts is a must. One observation of the CALL document is that basements offer good concealment for electromagnetic emissions. Nonetheless, while wooded and forested areas provide camouflage, they can have electromagnetic drawbacks. As the document notes, thick vegetation and foliage can hamper certain communications frequencies.
Electromagnetic concealment
Other suggested electromagnetic concealment techniques include preventing the accumulation of military personnel near the command post. Having numerous personnel located nearby using radios or other electromagnetically dependent systems could generate emissions which can be exploited by the enemy. The use of wi-fi should be prohibited unless the command post’s work depends on this. No routers should be placed above the CP. Instead, routers should be located at ground level, or ideally placed underground when possible. Handheld, mobile and cellular communications should be banned in and around the CP. All antennas and associated radios should be moved a safe distance from the command post. If emissions from this equipment are detected and geolocated, there is less chance the CP will be damaged or destroyed. One technique cited by the document has been to use oval-shaped objects like a “lid form a large vessel such as a pot, bucket, etc.” to mimic a satellite communications antenna. Covering the object in white paint, chalk or white cloth gives added realism as do fake cables mimicking the antenna’s connections.
Additional electromagnetic concealment can be achieved using decoy emitters placed away from the CP, “but in a configuration that is believable and deceives the enemy.” The enemy can find the approximate location of the decoy CP by tracing its electromagnetic emissions.” Furthermore, “another method is to use a mobile team that imitates command and staff radio transmissions.” Nonetheless, the document concedes that “(i)t is difficult to hide the radio emissions of working communication devices from enemy EW means.”
HF dangers
CALL’s publication counsels against the use of command post High Frequency (HF: three megahertz/MHz to 30MHz) communications “because of their strong electromagnetic emissions and easily recognised signature.” If HF radio must be used power settings should be kept as low as possible and terrain masking employed to hide the HF antennas. Although “(m)obile internet connection is less dependent on distance and terrain … enemy EW can easily find the signature and location of routers.”
Although CALL’s publication is written from the perspectives of what has, and more importantly what has not, worked from an electromagnetic perspective, its findings have implications beyond Ukraine. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) land forces are no doubt eagerly adopting such techniques. Should NATO find itself in a shooting war with Russia these electromagnetic lessons learned will prove invaluable.
by Dr. Thomas Withington
