The Islamic Republic of Iran has received GT-01 Murmansk-BN communications jamming systems from Russia.
Media reports in early August disclosed that Russia has delivered its GT-01 Murmansk-BN Communications Jamming (COMJAM) system to Iran. The reports did not disclosed how many systems have been acquired although another article did hint that several have been delivered. These Murmansk-BN systems are not the first Russian Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities acquired by Iran. As Armada has reported, Iran’s Cobra-V8 is thought to be a local version of Russia’s 1RL257E Krasukha-4 electronic warfare system. We have also disclosed that Iran has acquired Russia’s IL222M Avtobaza-M EW platform.
Murmansk-BN
Official Russian language documents seen by Armada, and sources close to the Russian EW industry, have provided indications of the Murmansk-BN’s capabilities. The system is mobile and housed on six trucks. Four trucks each accommodate one of the system’s 32-metre/m (102-feet/ft) high antennas. The antenna trucks are typically spaced across a 90-degree arc with 35m (114ft) of spacing between each. One truck houses the command post and another the generator which produces 400 kilowatts of power. Targets for the Murmansk-BN include High Frequency (HF: three megahertz/MHz to 30MHz) radios and networks. Emphasis is placed on targeting beyond line-of-sight HF skywave emitters. Effective ranges of between 5,000 kilometres/km (2,699 nautical miles/nm) and 8,000km (4,318nm) have been quoted for the Murmansk-BN.
Targets
The Murmansk-BN entered service with the Russian military in 2016. At least one system is thought to equip each of the Russian Army’s four independent electronic warfare brigades. A single system is likely to furnish the 15th Electronic Warfare Brigade which is directly subordinate to the Russian general staff. Armada has learned that a key target for the Murmansk-BN is the US military’s High Frequency Global Communications System (HFGCS). The HFGCS carries voice traffic across HF links and is a key channel for the carriage of Emergency Action Messages (EAMs). EAMs contain Command and Control (C2) information regarding the US nuclear deterrent. Attacking the HFGCS would be a key target of the Murmansk-BN in periods of high tension and war with the US and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Jamming HFGCS transmissions could help deprive US and NATO nuclear forces of C2 information. HF is also used for NATO and allied Link-11 (two megahertz to 29.9MHz, 225MHz to 399.975MHz) Tactical Datalink (TDL) traffic. Link-11 is a TDL which supports maritime operations.
Iran and Murmansk-BN
It is not surprising that the Iranian military has chosen to acquire the GT-01 Murmansk-BN. Tensions remain high between the Islamic Republic, Israel and the latter’s allies. On 13th April, Iran performed a large, combined missile, rocket and uninhabited aerial vehicle attack against targets in Israel. These attacks were launched from Iran and by Iranian proxies in Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen. A coordinated response by Israeli, US and allied air defences blunted the severity of Iran’s attack which resulted in no fatalities.
The success of the air defence effort was due in part to robust and resilient communications. While the precise details of the networks used have not been revealed, it would not be surprising if they included Link-11. The TDL would have assisted the battle management of the air defence effort. The Iranian military has an interest in degrading Link-11 should it find itself once again crossing swords with Israel and her allies. Meanwhile, Iran’s ongoing clandestine nuclear weapons programme makes the Islamic Republic a potential nuclear target. Any use of these weapons by Iran could bring a response in kind from Israel, the United States and/or their NATO nuclear-armed allies. Blunting the efficiency of the HFGCS is clearly in Iran’s interests.
Degrading US and allied HF networks maybe easier said than done. The US nuclear deterrent uses several communications links for EAM traffic. This is done to ensure redundancy so that the degradation or elimination of one network does not stop the flow of Emergency Action Messages. Link-11, and its Link-22 successor which uses the same frequencies, are both secure networks. While Murmansk-BN maybe effective against unsecured HF links, encrypted and secure networks may present challenges. Nonetheless, the recent Murmansk-BN acquisition illustrates that Iran’s appetite for Russian EW materiel shows little sign of abating.
by Dr. Thomas Withington
