The Invisible Power: the role of the Electromagnetic Spectrum in Russian surveillance, offensive and defensive operations in Ukraine
Pasquale Iorillo
Armada is proud to launch the Curran Papers, a new series of articles written by electromagnetic spectrum specialists and practitioners. The series is named after Dr. Joan Curran, a Welsh physicist known for her pioneering work developing the chaff anti-radar countermeasure during the Second World War. We hope the series honours her memory by showcasing innovative perspectives relevant to Electronic Warfare (EW) and Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (EMSO).
In our first Curran Paper, Pasquale Iorillo shares his perspectives on the importance of the electromagnetic spectrum to both sides in the ongoing war in Ukraine. The article chronicles the key place of EW in Russian land forces tactical doctrine. It examines the influence of recent Russian EW operations in Syria and Georgia, and their influence on the current war in Ukraine. The article concludes by discussing the importance of EW in Russian information operations its impact in the land environment on contemporary and future conflicts.
In his memoirs of the Second World War Sir Winston Churchill, the United Kingdom’s prime minister, referred to an invisible battle waged through innovative technologies such as radar, radio waves, and encrypted signals, hidden behind the noise of conventional warfare and mainly unknown to the public. Today, that ‘Wizard War’ persists and has become even more decisive, capable of shaping the outcomes of conflicts with its silent, unseen power.
Introduction
In modern warfare, the Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS) has become a critical environment influencing operations and determining conflict outcomes through its impact on surveillance, offensive actions, and defensive strategies. This paradigm is especially evident in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, a clear case study of how EMSO is transforming modern warfare. Both Russia and Ukraine have used these operations to shape the dynamics of the conflict, showing how mastery of the EMS can drastically alter the course of a war.
In this context, Russia’s extensive use of ‘Radioelektronnaya Borba’ (REB/radio electronic warfare) is a clear example of this strategic approach.[1] By combining REB with conventional military tactics, Moscow has shown how effectively EMS superiority, albeit temporarily, can negatively influence and even affect adversary operations.[2] Sophisticated techniques such as surveying, jamming, spoofing, and deception have significantly impaired opposing forces’ communications and decision-making processes, creating operational confusion and uncertainty through blinding. When integrated with kinetic operations, the synergy between EMSO and engagements amplifies the effectiveness of Russia’s military campaign, demonstrating that control of the electromagnetic spectrum is not merely advantageous but crucial to battlefield success.
For instance, as demonstrated in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, jamming has frequently preceded artillery strikes, effectively blinding enemy radar and communications to ensure a higher success rate for kinetic operations. This appeared to be in line with Russia’s use of REB, where electromagnetic deception misled opponents about the disposition and intentions of friendly forces, facilitating surprise and maintaining strategic initiative on the battlefield. Additionally, the protective dimension of EMSO involves actions designed to shield one’s electromagnetic assets from enemy interference, reinforcing operational resilience. This convergence of electromagnetic and traditional military operations serves as a critical force multiplier, significantly enhancing the operational tempo and effectiveness of manoeuvre. Consequently, today’s military organisations must develop the capability to operate effectively within the electromagnetic environment. This essay will explore the peculiarities of EMSO in recent conflicts, providing insights for both technical experts and non-specialists, and confirming the central role of the spectrum to modern and future operations.
Russia’s employment of Electromagnetic Operations
Between 2009 and 2018, the Russian armed forces increased their REB units by 150 percent.[3] This significant growth underscored the critical importance of EMSO to the Russian military. As outlined by the US Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate analysis, Russian military doctrine emphasises the integration of REB into all levels of military operations, from strategic planning to tactical execution on the battlefield.[4] This approach reflects the belief that controlling the information domain, and disrupting adversary communications and detection capabilities, is essential for gaining operational advantages. Consequently, REB could be seen as a support function and an indispensable component of modern military operations, developing a wide array of systems designed to disrupt, deceive, and destroy enemy communication networks. Defensively, these technologies protect Russian forces by disrupting enemy Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities thus limiting their ability to detect and target Russian units. Offensively, REB dismantle enemy command and control infrastructure, effectively severing communication lines and disrupting coordination among hostile forces. Moreover, during reconnaissance operations, these technologies facilitate the secure acquisition of intelligence by detecting and neutralising enemy surveillance systems. This allows Russian units to navigate the battlefield with increased stealth.
In this regard, these REB techniques not only disrupt enemy communications but also deceive weapon systems and sensors, reducing the effectiveness of enemy defences and becoming indispensable to the full spectrum of Russian tactical actions.[5] A notable example is represented by the deployment of REB systems, which include mobile and fixed platforms capable of large-scale jamming operations, along the entire Ukrainian front.[6] These complexes, integrated into tactical units such as brigades and battalions, support offensive and defensive operations.
Building upon these REB capabilities, most notably in Ukraine, the Tactical Reconnaissance Strike Complex (TRSC) also known as the Reconnaissance Fire Complex, has significantly enhanced battlefield awareness.[7] By integrating Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), precision-guided artillery and electronic warfare capabilities the TRSC enables continuous intelligence gathering and precision strike operations, reshaping conventional combat dynamics. This continuous surveillance, coupled with dynamic REB measures, induces periods of heightened vulnerability for adversarial forces, thereby highlighting the crucial importance of EMS dominance. The development of this advanced complex illustrates that mastery of the spectrum not only impedes enemy communications, but also amplifies the accuracy and lethality of kinetic engagements.[8]
Visibility and the risk of engagement in the electromagnetic spectrum
In the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, visibility within the spectrum constitutes a profound risk. If detected, forces are likely to be engaged. This highlights the criticality of adept spectrum management and the capability to reprogramme systems efficiently. Russia’s ‘radio-electromagnetic battle’ strategy effectively blends EMSO with kinetic actions such as artillery engagements. Within this operational framework, REB appears indispensable for orchestrating both offensive and defensive operations, rendering EMS management a cornerstone for augmenting situational awareness and facilitating rapid, synchronised responses.
Russia’s deployment of REB systems to incapacitate and disorient adversary forces is highly effective not only within the strategic framework but also at the operational and tactical levels. The capability to disrupt, deceive and alter the battlefield environment through sophisticated electronic warfare methodologies has been instrumental in hindering offensive campaigns and complicating battlefield permeation. Advances in jamming and UAV-based ISR have increased the lethality and complexity of these engagements, making the temporary and partial control of the spectrum a key factor in supporting the conduct of operations and determining their outcomes at all levels of warfare.
Conversely, the significance of the EMS is not a new concept for Russian military theorists. Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, former commander of the Soviet Navy asserted over sixty years ago in 1956 that:
Whoever controls the electromagnetic spectrum on the battlefield will win the next war.
This quotation summarises why Russia’s military doctrine stresses the coordination of REB with the offensive capabilities of indirect fire and precision-guided munitions, facilitating a coordinated attack on adversary defences and improving sensors-to-shooter links.[9] By concurrently jamming and misleading enemy communications while engaging them with targeted strikes, Russia severely hampers an adversary’s ability to respond effectively, undermining their decision-making processes.[10]
The deliberate disruption of adversary radar and communications through jamming, succeeded by targeted artillery, exemplifies the manner in which mastery of the EMS can significantly amplify the effectiveness of kinetic operations. This cohesive strategy, which merges electronic and physical offensives, allows Russian forces to sustain elevated operational tempos while simultaneously disorienting and neutralising their opponents. Furthermore, Moscow’s specialised REB units exhibit high levels of coordination with UAVs and ground-based sensors, ensuring synchronised operations and maintaining an optimal operational tempo.
All these operations epitomise the concept of the ‘radio-electromagnetic battle’, a doctrine seamlessly integrated into Russia’s TRSC. By effectively disrupting enemy communications and radar systems, REB initiatives significantly enhance both reconnaissance and strike capabilities, thus amplifying Russian forces’ lethality and operational efficiency.[11] Moreover, Russian EMSO demonstrates a high degree of coordination, mixing reconnaissance, fire support, and tactical activities to maximise operational effectiveness while disorienting the adversary. REB units are deployed across tactical, operational, and strategic command levels, ensuring a layered approach to defence and offence within the electromagnetic environment. This structure allows Russian forces to protect their systems from enemy countermeasures while gathering critical ISR data. Additionally, these operations support offensive cyber capabilities, identifying and geolocating enemy electronic assets for electronic attacks through jamming, spoofing, and other disruptive methods.
These aspects emerged in the Ukraine conflict with notable instances occurring near Kupiansk and Bakhmut, both in eastern Ukraine. There, Russian REB capabilities created complex, layered defences that significantly hindered Ukrainian UAV operations. By jamming aircraft control channels, Russian REB systems like the Silok-1 and Strizh-3 made it difficult for Ukrainian forces to maintain air superiority or deploy UAVs effectively, contributing to losses of up to 10,000 airframes per month.[12] Conversely, Russian EMSO in Syria were tailored towards diminishing the effectiveness of irregular forces that predominantly utilised less advanced communications, thereby concentrating REB efforts on neutralising hostile UAV activities and localised communications.[13] In the 2008 conflict with Georgia, the scope of Russia’s EMSO were comparatively restricted due to the engagement’s brief nature and the Georgian forces limited electronic warfare capabilities.
A discernible pattern emerges in evaluating Russian EMSO across various recent conflicts, highlighting both steadiness and innovation within Russian military strategy. The enduring theme across these operations is using EMSO to compromise adversary technological capabilities. However, the execution of these operations has undergone refinement, adapting to each battlefield’s distinct tactical, operational and strategic characteristics. In the Ukrainian conflict, a pivotal theatre for the advancement in achieving ‘Hertz and Minds’, Russia has skilfully implemented sophisticated tactics such as the jamming of UAV control systems, the disruption of communication channels and the targeting of global navigation satellite system position, navigation and timing signals.[14] Incorporating these measures into the broader TRSC further emphasises the critical importance of attaining electromagnetic superiority, albeit temporarily, for battlefield success. These tactics were employed in earlier engagements in Syria, where efforts were concentrated on incapacitating irregular forces’ comparatively unsophisticated communications. Nonetheless, the insights derived from the 2008 Georgia conflict were crucial in facilitating the development of more intricate and advanced spectrum strategies subsequently observed in the Ukrainian theatre. These strategies effectively secured information superiority by impairing adversary sensors and systems while simultaneously exemplifying the potential exploitation of the electromagnetic environment to bolster reconnaissance endeavours.[15]
A crucial aspect of Russian REB strategy is the concept of ‘maskirovka’, a long-standing Russian doctrine of camouflage and deception. Far from being just a tactical tool, maskirovka represents an operational philosophy that is deeply embedded in Russian military strategy. By leveraging REB capabilities, maskirovka employs deception and information manipulation to create uncertainty and induce critical misjudgements, distorting the adversary’s perception of the operational environment. This approach has been continually refined through Russian involvement in conflicts, ranging from the 2008 war in Georgia to ongoing operations in Ukraine and Syria.
As demonstrated in Ukraine, Russian EMSO are not only about disrupting enemy capabilities but also focus on reshaping the battlefield itself. By merging electromagnetic and kinetic operations, Russia’s forces have crafted a strategy that enables both offensive and defensive dominance, ensuring that they maintain control over the electromagnetic spectrum, an essential factor for achieving operational success.
Conclusion
As the Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz aptly observed:
(E)very age has its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions.[16]
Looking at the Ukrainian conflict, the spectrum has emerged as a pivotal environment in modern warfare, with Russia’s armed forces leveraging it for surveillance, reconnaissance, and both offensive and defensive activities. The growing exploitation of EMSO represents a paradigm shift, positioning the electromagnetic environment as a critical element in shaping the area of operations. Future conflicts will require greater emphasis on speed, convergence, and integration, particularly within EMSO. In this regard, manoeuvring within the electromagnetic environment will be vital for achieving tactical, operational and strategic success.
At the same time it is critical to consider that, despite technological advancements, warfare remains inherently human, driven by the timeless objective of securing superiority over the adversary. This balance between time, resources, and initiative will continue to dictate success. Victory could be pursued through various strategies such as having ample resources and time, operating with limited resources but accelerated initiatives, or constraining the adversary’s actions. Modern EMSO complicate this equation, challenging the human capacity to manage the growing complexity of warfare.
According to these considerations, Russian military doctrine exemplifies a deep understanding of the spectrum’s strategic value, emphasising disruption, deception and the protection of electromagnetic capabilities. The integration of jamming, deception, and spectrum management forms the core of the Russian approach, highlighting the importance of striving for, or achieving, control within the electromagnetic environment for operational success.
As conflicts evolve, the capacity to dominate this spectrum will invariably shape the future of military strategy and doctrine. Thus, the electromagnetic environment should be viewed not merely as a technical component but as a dynamic arena for manoeuvre. The Russian emphasis on EMSO is a warning of the transformative potential of mastering this environment, illuminating a path for armed forces worldwide to adopt and adapt in their strategic, operational, and tactical preparations for the conflicts of tomorrow.
About the author
Pasquale Iorillo is a researcher specialising in EW intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and EMSO; including EMSO’s cyber perspective. His work focuses on integrating advanced technologies within security frameworks and strategic and operational planning, with particular attention to lessons learned from military history. He has extensive experience in international projects and collaboration, also within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, contributing to various initiatives in the defence and security sectors. The information provided in this article is intended solely for academic and informational purposes. Any opinions expressed herein are those of the author.
References
[1] REB refers to using the EMS for military purposes such as targeting radio, radar and communication systems to disrupt, deceive, or deny enemy capabilities. While REB specifically focuses on radio-electronic warfare, broader EMSO encompasses other electromagnetic capabilities like infrared and laser systems. Russian military doctrine emphasises REB as an integral part of reconnaissance, fire and tactical operations and the enhancement of overall military effectiveness. For the rest of this discussion, we will refer to these capabilities as REB.
[2] Unlike in the past twenty years of operations, electromagnetic spectrum supremacy can no longer be regarded as an assumed and guaranteed factor in planning, neither by Western countries nor, for that matter, by their peer competitors.
[3] McDermott, R, ‘Electronic Warfare in Contemporary Russian Military Thought’, https://jamestown.org/program/electronic-warfare-in-contemporary-russian-military-thought/.
[4] ATP 7-100.1: Russian Tactics, US Army, 2024, https://rdl.train.army.mil/catalog-ws/view/100.ATSC/796D87F6-9E95-4D54-8ED9-DDA10E9C209E-1708699291986/ATP7_100x1.pdf.
[5] ‘No time to lose as lessons from Ukraine force the pace in electronic warfare’, https://www.janes.com/osint-insights/defence-news/air/special-report-no-time-to-lose-as-lessons-from-ukraine-force-the-pace-in-electronic-warfare.
[6] Tartachnyi, O, ‘The Invisible War: Inside the electronic warfare arms race that could shape the course of war in Ukraine’, https://kyivindependent.com/the-invisible-war-inside-the-electronic-warfare-arms-race-that-could-shape-course-of-the-war/.
[7] Bartles, C, Grau, LW, ‘The Russian Reconnaissance Fire Complex comes of age’, https://www.ccw.ox.ac.uk/blog/2018/5/10/the-russian-reconnaissance-fire-complex-comes-of-age.
[8] Bailey, R, Barros, G, Bugayova, N, Clark, M, Hird, K, Kagan, FW, Kagan, K, Stepanenko, K, Ukraine and the Problem of Restoring Maneuver in Contemporary War, (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, 2024).
[9] Axe, D, ‘Working fast and accurately, Russian drones and missiles are finding and destroying more of Ukraine’s best weapons’, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2024/03/22/working-fast-and-accurately-russian-drones-and-missiles-are-finding-and-destroying-more-of-ukraines-best-weapons/.
[10] Chiriac, OR, Withington, T, ‘Russian electronic warfare: from history to the modern battlefield’, https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/russian-electronic-warfare-from-history-to-modern-battlefield/.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Cranny-Evans, S, ‘Russia’s artillery war in Ukraine: challenges and innovations’, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russias-artillery-war-ukraine-challenges-and-innovations; ‘The Strizh-3 scourge in Ukraine’, https://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htada/articles/20230302.aspx; 16; Zikusoka, D, ‘The Future of war is electromagnetic’, https://www.newamerica.org/future-frontlines/blogs/the-future-of-war-is-electromagnetic/.
[13] Pomerleau, M, ‘Why Syria may be the most aggressive electronic warfare environment on Earth’, https://www.c4isrnet.com/electronic-warfare/2018/04/24/socom-chief-syria-most-aggressive-ew-environment-on-earth/.
[14] Withington, T, Hertz and Minds: The land tactical electronic warfare battle in Ukraine, (Cambridge/Toulouse: CRFS/Armada International, 2024).
[15] Asmus, RD, A Little War that Shook the World, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Courtney, WH, Lee, C, ‘Russia’s war in Ukraine: implications for future force development’, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA700/RRA791-1/RAND_RRA791-1.pdf.
[16] Von Clausewitz, C, On War, (translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret), (New York: Princeton University Press, 1984).
