Loitering munitions are proving their value, and their utility can be broadly defined across the battlefield.
The loitering munition and its use on the battlefield is receiving a great deal of attention from militaries and the general public where they are often referred to as the “kamikaze drones”. The graphic on-line video coverage from the war in Ukraine, in particular, has fostered the image of loitering munitions as a possible “wonder weapon”. Perhaps this is not surprising considering the incessant media exposure coupled with the unique nature of the weapons. Still the loitering munition has proven effective on the battlefield allowing a single operator to efficiently undertake search, identify, and accurately attack specific targets using an aerial perspective previously not possible.
Loitering munitions defined
The loitering munition (LM) could be defined as a self-contained airborne single use direct attack weapon. The LM uses a ground or aircraft mounted launcher that ejects a self-propelled flying platform containing a day/infrared camera, an RF and video link to a control, and a warhead. As they combine characteristics and capabilities found in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), artillery fired precision projectiles, and guided direct fire missiles it can be difficult to classify LMs within traditional weapon system categories.
Launching of LMs can be by catapult as the Russian ZALA Lancet, propelled from a tube as the AeroVironment 300 and 600 Switchblade, or use vertical take-off. Once airborne they proceed to a target area which may be pre-programmed working from prior intelligence or designated in flight by the operator. From its advantageous overhead position, the LM can continuously collect and pass video of the scene below to the operator via a data link. Typically using day and/or infrared (IR) cameras, this search prosecution can be aided by image processing offering automatic target detection, tracking, identification, and terminal guidance. Once the operator finds a target, they direct the LM against it essentially ‘crashing’ into it detonating the warhead. The ability to strike from above can enhance the lethality of the attack.
The LMs flight endurance determines the length of time it can spend both traveling to and searching a target area. For smaller munitions like the Switchblade this varies from 15 to 60 minutes while larger systems like the UVision/Rheinmetall HERO 1250 can stay aloft for up to six hours. A determining factor in endurance is the power source with electric driven systems limited by the battery life. For longer range, LM systems need to use fuel engines.
“The operational range, the distance from the control station that the system can operate,” John Aldana, programme manager for Switchblade at AeroVironment explained, “is primarily influence by the ability to maintain an effective communication link. This can be influenced by many factors including the terrain, the location of the control station, and altitude of the aerial vehicle.” Range can be improved by many of the techniques employed with any RF link like elevating the antenna off the ground station using a telescoping mast, employing signal relay or networking. The RF connection is also vulnerable to disruption by jamming or other electronic warfare (EW) measures. Reducing this weakness by moving from “a continuous communications link to one which sends burst data transmissions,” Aldana suggested, “is a development focus”. Another is working to increase the autonomy of the LM in executing functions from navigation to target acquisition and attack which would reduce the reliance on the RF link. It also, however, eliminates the ‘man-in-the-loop’ aspect of the system which permits a human operator to authorise the final strike.
So far, the conduct of an LM mission resembles that of a ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) unmanned aerial system. The difference is that whereas the ISR drone provides information that may be utilised for other weapons like artillery, to strike an observed target, the LM itself becomes the ‘effector’. Using the optical sensors, the operator can select the target and potentially aided by image processing, track and ‘lock-on’ directing the LM to crash into the target. LM’s have an advantage of being able to strike from above with some ability to adjust their approach to achieve an optimal attack, such as into a window or the top of a combat vehicle. This is important since the size of the LM warhead can be limited. This is particularly true with man-portable tactical munitions. The HERO-30 and Switchblade 300 intended for dismounted infantry use respectively a 1.1 pound (5 kilogram) and 5.5lb (2.5kg) explosive charge. Thus, assuring the LM detonates for optimum effect is vital. Larger LMs such as the HAROP produced by Israel Aerospace Industries intended for SEAD (Air Defence Suppression) containing a larger 50.6lb (23kg) warhead. Iran’s Shaheb131 (used by Russia as the Geran-1) has 33lb (15kg) warhead. Though larger, these are still less than that of the M31 Rocket fired by the MLRS and HIMARS at 196lb (89kg). Employing a warhead optimised to a particular target set can enhance the LM target effect. The Switchblade 600, for example, essentially employs the same warhead as the Javelin anti-tank guided missile.
Recognising the array of different targets, the LMs may be employed against designers are offering a choice of warheads. The Ukrainian developed catapult launched RAM II is offered with either a 3 kg (6.6) high-explosive anti-tank, a high explosive fragmentation, or a thermobaric warhead with the last specialised for threats inside building. BlueBird Aero Systems in its new LM debuted at the 2023 Paris Air Show offers two warhead types; one optimised for penetrating heavier armour and a second with air-burst fragmentation intended for engaging personnel. According to marketing director Guy Maymon “the soldier can switch out to the warhead best suited to an expected threat or mission.”
Roles and missions
LMs offered in various configurations can be employed in distinct roles and missions. These applications could include tactical combat use by brigade and below, deep battlefield strike capability for brigade and higher, and use in the broader operational campaign. The tactical combat use is that which is represented in most LM coverage from the Ukraine. Militaries are moving to widely adopt these. These represent the smaller LMs employed by small units generally up to battalion and possibly brigade level. They offer these units the organic ability to find and responsively and precisely attack targets beyond line-of-site (BLOS). These ‘low end’ tactical LMs are deployed with or just behind forward elements. Ideally, they should be used against targets of interest that cannot be efficiently addressed by other available weapons. These could include fleeting targets of opportunity and destruction of masked threats in support of friendly defensive and offensive action. The later could include hunting and attacking opposing artillery positions, command posts, forward anti-air systems, local supply and ammunition caches, repositioning/reinforcing units and enemy UAS and LM positions and control stations. Capitalising on the LM’s precision and very short identification to attack cycle while minimising the LM’s short comings like its limited warhead lethality can demand creative non-traditional engagement. For example, taking advantage of the LM’s reconnaissance abilities to discover and attack a gun battery’s ammunition cache rather than the guns themselves. However, as US Army artillery Major Brennan Deveraux has suggested in several pieces, “loitering munitions cannot and should not replace artillery. Instead, they must augment the division’s fires capability.” LMs by their very nature are intended for specific point targets but ill-suited to deliver either sustained fires, suppression, or the neutralisation of a large target area. In addition, artillery and mortars remain the principal mechanism for delivering smoke, illumination, mine submunitions and other ordnance packages.
LMs appropriate for the tactical role are already being introduced despite the lack of defined employment concepts. At battalion and company level and below the AeroVironment tube-launched Switchblade 300, the hand-launched IAI Point Blank/ROC-X, Rafael SPIKE FIRELFY portable vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) loitering munition meet tactical demands. These tactical LM designs emphasise portability, simple operation, and ideally should be relatively inexpensive allowing them to be available and issued in large numbers based on the tactical situation. This possible employment is how single use anti-armour weapons like the Saab AT-4 are employed. It eliminates the need for dedicated gunners while allowing LMs to be deployed in quantity when appropriate.
For battalion and brigade support the Aerovironment Switchblade 600, Rheinmetall HERO400EC, Polish GB WB Group Warmate, and Russian ZALA Lancet are often more appropriate candidates. This role demands greater endurance of several hours and to maintain its RF link to greater ranges. The increased platform size permits use of a more lethal warhead but also leads to a dedicated weapon’s team and the need to provide some form of battlefield mobility. These LMs are those typically employed on vehicles.
The US Marines LM equipped 8×8 Light Armoured Vehicle uses the HERO120. Its eight cell Multi-Canister Launcher, however, can also accept the HERO-30 and 400EC. Jim Truxel, CEO of UVision USA, designer of the MCL explained: “the MCLs will be installed on various platforms” which could include tactical trucks or watercraft. LMs at this level could expect taskings based on intelligence gathered by other sources, such as to attack a high value air defence radar operating in an area but for which a precise location is unknown.
Such missions could also see the use of several LMs working in cooperation with an ISR UAV. In a similar manner, the Elbit Systems SkyStriker is designed to be used from a common launcher also loaded with traditional rockets. The 250 mile (400km) range SkyStriker, Yaniv Ben-Itzhak, Elbit’s director of marketing and business development, explained, “can be launched as either an LM or with a high-resolution target-seeker camera perform ISR. It then offers the operator options of attacking with rockets or directly with the LM”. RTX’s Abel Ghanooi, senior director SHORAD & Rapid Development Programmes, reflected that “the optimal close battle effectiveness of LMs is obtained when they are able to be employed in mass” rather than piecemeal. Further, having LMs that can utilise launch platforms and control systems that are already in service would offer significant advantages including enhancing employment flexibility and facilitating fielding and support. In fact, according to Ghanooi, RTX has practically demonstrated this possibility.
Deep battle strike
Attack of targets beyond the immediate battle area have in the past been conducted by attack aircraft. Over the past years, facing more effective air defences ground launched weapons like the MCM-140 ATACMS and PRsM used with the MLRS and Lockheed Martin HIMARS and the Russian 9K720 Iskander are being relied upon for this role. The later, however, require a sound target location. Even cruise missiles with terminal homing ideally need to be directed to a specific area. LMs designed with greater endurance have the advantage of being able to independently search, a particularly valuable trait where the exact location of a target is not known. This allows an LM to be launched to the general area of a suspected threat and then attempt to locate and attack it.
LMs offering these capabilities are available. The IAI Harpy with nine hours endurance and up to 15,000 feet (4,570 metres) operating ceiling is one proven candidate. Equipped with an anti-radiation seeker, it is optimised for detecting radar, especially those associated with air defences and homing in to destroy them. In such a role increased autonomy offers potential advantages allowing the munition to home in on the radar signal once it becomes active. The ALTIUS 700 by Anduril Industries with a range of 310 miles (500km) and an endurance of up to five hours is another. With a weight of 65lb (30kg) it requires a catapult launcher, although it has also been employed from aircraft including helicopters and Lockheed Martin C-130 referred to as Aerial Launched Effect (ALE). In July 2023 the Peoples Republic of China’s Aerospace announced that it is developing its own long-range loitering munition. The system design will combine kinetic attack with ISR, communications relay, radar/signal jamming, and suppression, and battle damage assessment.
RTX’s Ghanooi, suggested: “the term loitering munition is somewhat limiting in reflecting the potential that these platforms offer in its focus on kinetic results. In fact, the term loitering effects could be considered more appropriate. The kinetic effector is but one payload capability that could be used. ISR, electronic warfare, jamming, and other mission effect payloads could be accommodated.” This approach would be especially valuable using a common payload carrier in division and higher echelon applications.
Possibilities and pitfalls
The capabilities and weakness of LMs are still being worked out. As is often the case with a new weapon or military equipment that is suddenly introduced directly onto the battlefield determining how it is best employed and where it fits within the organisation requires real-world experience and study. Even as LMs are being fielded into combat the broader implications regarding their employment within the battle space, as well as, how they fit with other existing weapon systems remains unclear. Is the LM a substitute for current indirect fire weapons like tube artillery and mortars or a complement? Could the augment or replace other combat systems with similar capabilities or that currently fill similar functions – for example attack helicopters? Where are they best placed within the force structure? Should they be integrated within existing units as another weapon or placed into dedicated organisations? Are they best attached, direct support, or in general support? What are their support and resupply needs and who will fill them? Finally, how will such a system capable of widely distributed employment against targets beyond line of sight at extended ranges be controlled and coordinated?
Similarly, it is critical to determine how LMs can be defeated and these counters to be implemented. Historically, such new and ‘revolutionary’ capabilities can dominate the battlefield, as occurred with the machine gun, the submarine, tanks, and tactical air, until an appropriate response is introduced and effectively fielded. It is entirely possible that the seeming decisive advantage demonstrated by LM might be at least partly attributed as much to its novelty and resultant lack of fielded counters both in physical systems and in methods of movement, unit tactics, and individual awareness as to its inherent properties. Just as infantry in battle lines were made inappropriate by the breech loading rifle and machine gun, so to may current tactical manoeuvres need to evolve in the face of the LM and drones. It might also be that the problem of the LM attack, at least against vehicles, could be sufficiently similar to that of other anti-armour munitions (RPG, ATGMs, etc.) that self-protection systems against these might be adapted to counter the LM. Certainly counter-unmanned aerial system (C-UAS) systems once fielded in sufficient numbers should ideally be able to address the LM as well.
RTX’s Ghanooi, shared “foremost in our process of developing more capable loitering effectors should be consideration of the vulnerabilities they may possess. Only in this way is it possible to both identify assuring addressing these weaknesses in one’s own systems but also potential approaches to defeating those of your opponent.” Given the high level of threat which the LM has demonstrated, the potential to deliver across all battlefield domains including ground, maritime, and even in the air; applying this concept with a greater urgency could be recommended.
by Stephen W. Miller
