The rapid end of Syria’s civil war, and the fall of the Assad regime, may have highlighted shortcomings in Russian tactical communications, and the proficiency of Turkish electronic warfare.
The lightning dash across Syria by the Ha’yat Tahir al-Sham (HTS) Islamist militia group came as a surprise. Syria had been gripped by civil war since 2011. An uneasy peace took hold from July 2017 following a ceasefire brokered by Jordan, Russia and the United States which collapsed in late November 2024. HTS led an advance by a coalition of organisations opposing the regime of Syria’s dictator Bashir al-Assed. HTS forces initially captured the city of Aleppo in the north. Hama in western, central Syria was the next conurbation to fall. By 6th December the western city of Homs was in the opposition’s hands with the capital Damascus falling on 8th December. Mr. Assad fled to Moscow with his family on the night of 6th/7th December while HTS declared victory.
HTS and its associates seemed to meet little meaningful opposition from Syria’s military as they drove across the country. Reports state that 261 Syrian, Iranian and Russian cadres were killed during the battles, with 21 Syrian troops captured. Both the governments of Russia and Iran were enthusiastic backers of Mr. Assad’s regime. Meanwhile, HTS and supporting groups lost 371. Why the regime and its military collapsed so quickly will be studied for years. One strategic factor highlighted in recent analysis has been the lack of willingness of Moscow and Tehran to continue supporting Mr. Assad. With both his major supporters now essentially quitting, did the Syrian military still have the stomach for a fight?
Turkish EW
Another reason for Syria’s military collapse which has come to light is the alleged proficiency of Turkish Communications Jamming (COMJAM) systems. Information began to circulate on social media that these capabilities were successful in attacking Syrian military communications networks. With their radios jammed, Syrian command and control was significantly impeded. As the intelligenceonline.com website later confirmed, Turkish Electronic Warfare (EW) assets were integral to the HTS advance.
Turkey’s government had supported the Free Syrian Army in its efforts to unseat Mr. Assad’s regime since the eruption of the civil war. Ankara invaded northern Syria in 2016 to attack Kurdish insurgent organisations, and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria cadres, operating there. Open sources state that Aselsan’s Milkar-A42 and Ilgar-3LT COMJAM platforms proved particularly useful. These systems were deployed to areas controlled by the Turkish military in and around the northern Syrian city of Idlib.
The Milkar-A2 is a vehicle-mounted COMJAM system which attacks High Frequency (HF: three megahertz/MHz to 30MHz) communications in support of land force manoeuvre, according to Aselsan. The Milkar-A2 can also demodulate HF traffic allowing it to be exploited for communications intelligence. The Ilgar-3LT provides similar capabilities against Very/Ultra High Frequency (V/UHF: 30MHz to three gigahertz) communications traffic. It is understood that these systems were particularly effective against Р-168 Акведук (R-168 Aqueduct) HF and V/UHF, Р-187П Азарт (R-187P Excitement) V/UHF tactical radios. More information on both radios can be found here. These transceivers are believed to have been supplied to Syrian forces and were also used by Russian troops in Syria. Russia deployed forces into Syria to support Mr. Assad’s regime from 2015.
Assessment
Jamming these radios and their networks may have helped precipitate the Syrian military’s collapse in the face of the HTS advance. Turkish electronic warfare acumen has come to the fore in recent years, illustrated by the proficiency of Turkish EW cadres in Syria. Turkish electronic warfare equipment supplied to Ukraine has also performed well. The Ukraine theatre of operations has provided a laboratory in which Turkish EW equipment can be tested and improved. Improvements based on electromagnetic observations in Ukraine can then be cycled back into electronic warfare system design and performance enhancements. Despite the R-168 and R-187P being among the most modern and secure tactical radios deployed by Russian land forces they appear vulnerable to Turkish jamming. Such vulnerabilities can only be good news for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Likewise, the inadequacy of Russian communications kit is an additional embarrassment for the regime of Russia’s President Vladimir Putin. Mr. Putin is already having to face the humiliation of backing the losing side.
by Dr. Thomas Withington
